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Abstract 
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Although atypical moral and empathy processing are considered core features of 
psychopathic personality, little is known about how these constructs are associated with 
psychopathic traits in the general population. One-hundred-twenty-four adult males from the 
community were administered the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale 4 Short Form, as well as a 
wide battery of affect, empathy and morality tasks and questionnaires. Our findings indicate 
that both core affective-interpersonal, as well as lifestyle-antisocial features of psychopathy 
are associated with weaker empathic responses to fearful faces. However, only the unique 
variance of the affective-interpersonal features is associated with weaker empathic response 
to happy stories, lower propensity to feel empathic concern and less difficulty in making 
decisions on moral dilemmas. In contrast, the unique variance of the lifestyle-antisocial 
features is associated with greater propensity to feel empathic concern. These preliminary 
findings extend previous research and suggest that, while the joint variance between 
affective-interpersonal and lifestyle-antisocial features might drive some ‘deficits’ associated 
with psychopathy, there also appears also to be unique ‘deficits’ associated with the core 
affective-interpersonal features, particularly in relation to affective aspects of moral 
processing. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Lack of empathy and amoral behaviour are considered core features of the psychopathic 
personality (Blair, Mitchell, & Blair, 2005). However, little is known about how specific 
dimensions of empathy and morality are associated with psychopathic traits in the general 
population. In the current study we employed several paradigms concurrently to investigate 
these associations.   
 
1.1. Dimensions of psychopathic personality 
Based on formal assessment with the Psychopathy Checklist – Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003), 
the syndrome of psychopathy can be diagnosed in forensic settings when an individual scores 
high on two dimensions. One, traditionally referred to as Factor 1, is characterized by 
affective and interpersonal features such as reduced guilt, empathy and attachment to 
significant others, along with deceptive, manipulative interactions. The other, Factor 2, 
relates to features involving impulsivity, poor behavioural control and antisocial behaviour 
(Hare, 2003; Hare & Neumann, 2008).  
 
Recent taxometric studies suggest that psychopathy is a dimensional construct rather than a 
qualitatively distinct category of behaviour, and that psychopathic traits are best viewed as 
existing on a continuum, thus providing an empirical basis for studying individuals in terms 
of level of psychopathic traits rather than limiting studies to extreme groups (See Hare & 
Neumann, 2008 for a review). The strength of this dimensional perspective has led to a 
growing number of community studies on psychopathy (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006). Findings 
from these studies often mirror those observed in clinical/forensic samples (Benning, Patrick, 
& Iacono, 2005; Hall & Benning, 2006), further strengthening the view that there are 
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continuities between community and forensic participants in the mechanisms underlying 
psychopathy.  
 
The presence of dysfunctional affective-interpersonal features is considered to be the core 
characteristic of psychopathy, distinguishing individuals who are psychopathic from those 
who are antisocial but not psychopathic (Blair, et al., 2005). Evidence from forensic and 
community samples also suggest that the two dimensions of psychopathy present distinct 
associations with various criterion measures of personality, emotionality and behaviour, 
particularly when their shared variance is controlled (e.g. Hicks & Patrick, 2006; Patrick, 
Hicks, Nichol, & Krueger, 2007; Uzieblo, Verschuere, van den Bussche, & Crombez, 2010),  
highlighting the distinct influence each dimension may have and the importance of inspecting 
the unique contribution of each dimension in order to provide a more comprehensive map of 
the psychopathy construct.  
 
1.2. Emotional empathy, morality and psychopathy 
Although there isn’t complete agreement regarding the precise definition of empathy and its 
constitutive components (Batson, 2009) empathy is normally understood as an affective state 
caused by sharing the emotions of another person (Eisenberg, 2000; Hoffman, 2000; Singer, 
2006). Emotional empathy, or simply empathy, can be defined by the subject’s emotional 
state resulting from the observation or imagination of another person’s state; the subject’s 
emotional state is isomorphic but the subject is aware that it is vicariously elicited by the 
emotional state of the other person (Singer, 2006).  
 
Empathy and morality have long been conceptually linked (Eisenberg, 2000; Hoffman, 
2000), and empathy is thought to play a crucial role in moral behaviour. Empathy is not 
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considered to be pro-social per se. However, with further cognitive processing, empathic 
response may develop into empathic concern, guilt or a combination of the two. Such 
prototypical moral emotions are thought to provide the motivational force to ‘do good’ and 
avoid ‘doing bad’ (Moll & de Oliveira-Souza, 2007), and function as an emotional moral 
barometer, providing immediate and salient feedback on behaviour (Tangney, Stuewig, & 
Mashek, 2007). Actual behaviour is not necessary for this barometer to function, as people 
can anticipate their likely emotional reactions when considering behavioural alternatives. 
Emotional empathy can thus be regarded as a necessary step in a chain that begins with affect 
recognition and emotional contagion, and is followed by understanding another person’s 
feelings; this understanding provides the basis for experiencing moral emotions, such as 
concern and guilt that in turn motivate moral behaviour.  
 
Past research has found that adults and children with high levels of psychopathic traits have a 
selective impairment in the recognition of others’ distress, particularly fear and sadness (e.g. 
Blair, Colledge, Murray, & Mitchell, 2001; Blair, et al., 2002; Blair et al., 2004; Montagne, et 
al., 2005). However, this impairment does not appear as consistent in community samples 
(Del Gaizo & Falkenbach, 2008). Adults and children with psychopathic traits have also 
shown reduced autonomic response to stimuli associated with distress in others (Blair, 1999; 
Blair, Jones, Clark, & Smith, 1997) and, in a community sample, adults with high traits of  
dysfunctional affective-interpersonal features have shown blunted affective empathic 
responses to the emotional displays of others (Ali, Amorim, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2009).  
 
Adults with psychopathy do not seem to show different patterns of responses regarding the 
endorsement of actions in moral dilemmas compared to controls (Cima, Tonnaer, & Hauser, 
2010; Glenn, Raine, Schug, Young, & Hauser, 2009). However, they do show reduced 
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amygdala activity when responding to the same moral dilemmas, and those with particularly 
high scores of callousness show further reduced activity in several regions considered to be 
part of the moral circuitry (Glenn, Raine, & Schug, 2009). Some researchers have argued 
these individuals are able to distinguish between right and wrong but do not care (e.g. Cima, 
et al., 2010) as their moral knowledge appears to be intact but their moral emotions appear 
deficient failing to motivate moral behaviour.  
 
In the current study we employed several paradigms concurrently to investigate how different 
features of the psychopathic personality are associated with distinct components of affect, 
empathy and morality described above. Based on previous research, we predicted that 
affective-interpersonal features would be associated with lower scores on various measures of 
affect, empathy and morality. We also predict that impulsive-antisocial behaviour features 
would be associated with greater scores on those measures. 
 
2. Material and Methods 
 
2.1. Participants 
One-hundred-twenty-four adult males from western English speaking countries with ages 
between 18 and 48 (M= 26.23; SD= 7.07), and estimated IQ between 79 and 137 (M= 
115.81; SD= 13.14), were recruited from the University College London Psychology Subject 
Pool and through online advertisement. Participants provided written informed consent and 
were compensated with £10 for their time. 
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2.2. Procedure 
All tasks and questionnaires, apart from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
(WASI; Wechsler, 1999), were presented on a computer using Psytools software (Delosis 
Limited). All tasks were presented randomly across participants and were followed by the 
questionnaires.  
 
2.3. Materials 
2.3.1 Assessment of General ability 
The WASI (Wechsler, 1999) Full-Scale IQ Two-Subtest (FSIQ-2) was used to produce an 
estimate of general cognitive ability. 
 
2.3.2. Assessment of psychopathic traits 
Psychopathic traits were assessed with the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale 4 Short Form 
(SRP-4-SF; Paulhus, Neumann & Hare, in press), a 29-item scale designed to measure 
psychopathic attributes in non-institutionalised samples. The SRP-4-SF assesses 
psychopathic traits, organised in four facets – interpersonal, affective, lifestyle and antisocial 
— consistent with recent research on the PCL-R. However, like the PCL-R, the four facets 
can be modelled in terms of the traditional two-factor dimensions. The SRP has been shown 
to have good construct validity and is strongly correlated with the PCL-R (Lilienfeld & 
Fowler, 2006; Paulhus, Neumann, & Hare, in press),  
 
2.3.3. Measures of Affect, Empathy and Morality 
 
 
2.3.3.1. Emotion Multimorph Task 
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The Emotion Multimorph task, previously used by Blair and colleagues (2004) and Rogers 
and colleagues (2006), is a measure of sensitivity to recognise emotional facial expressions. 
Three identities were prepared for each emotion (sadness, fear, anger and happiness) by 
gradually morphing a neutral affect expression into the prototypical emotional expression in 
20 stages of 2 seconds each. Presentation order of stimuli was randomized across 
participants. Mean expression recognition stage scores were computed following the 
procedure used in Blair and colleagues (2004). 
 
2.3.3.2. Empathy image task using the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM-Faces) 
Based on Ali and colleagues (2009), this task estimates participants’ emotional response to 
emotional faces using the Self Assessment Manikin (SAM) methodology. The SAM has 
strong psychometric properties and is widely used to measure affective response (Bradley & 
Lang, 1994). In the present task, participants were asked to rate their affective state when 
watching images depicting a person showing a sad, fearful, angry, happy or neutral 
expression. The valence scale ranges from a low-spirited manikin to a widely smiling one, 
going through a middle neutral stance; low ratings on the manikin mean negatively valenced 
affective responses and high ratings mean positively valenced affective responses. This task 
is thought to tap into the emotional empathy construct as it not only estimates participants’ 
vicarious response to emotional stimuli, but also comprises elements of self-awareness 
(participants have to evaluate their emotional response) and self/other distinction (participants 
are asked how the stimulus makes them feel). To create the image set for this task, 30 
pictures for each emotion were selected from gettyimages_database, istockphoto and other 
public sources. Each picture consisted of one person, whose face was the focal point of the 
image. Eight postgraduates rated each picture according to what emotion was displayed, its 
valence and arousal. From the initial set, 8 images were selected for each emotion (4 female 
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and 4 male). Criteria for selection were complete inter-rater agreement over emotion 
portrayed, and consistency of valence and arousal ratings. Selected images were randomised 
for each participant. Cronbach’s α of valence scores on this task were 0.89 for sad, 0.82 for 
fearful, 0.72 for angry, 0.72 for neutral, and 0.88 for happy faces. 
 
2.3.3.3. Empathy-Eliciting Short Stories task using the SAM (SAM-Stories) 
The SAM-Stories task was designed to assess participants’ emotional response to emotional 
short stories using the SAM methodology. Participants were presented with 12 short stories 
portraying sadness, anger or happiness. To generate the story set for this task, 24 original 
short stories were created and presented to 8 postgraduates indicated what emotion was 
portrayed in each story and rated its intensity. Criteria for selection were complete inter-rater 
agreement over emotion portrayed, and consistency on intensity ratings. Cronbach’s α of 
valence scores on this task were 0.79 for anger, 0.83 for happy, and 0.78 for sad stories.  
 
2.3.3.4.Empathic Concern Scale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980)  
The empathic concern scale assesses the tendency to experience feelings of sympathy and 
compassion for others (e.g. "I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate 
than me"). 
 
2.3.3.5. Moral emotions task  
Adapted from Kédia and colleagues (2008), this task comprised the presentation of brief 
stories depicting prototypical moral situations, i.e. “an agent harms a victim”. Depending on 
whether the agent and the victim are the self or other, these stories would elicit four kinds of 
moral emotions: Guilt, Compassion, Self-Anger and Other-Anger. As the main goal was to 
focus on moral emotions, the harmful action is performed unintentionally in all stories to 
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prevent possible interferences from other cognitive processes likely involved in moral 
judgement. In the original task 20 different scenarios were used, with 6 possible endings 
each. In order to make the task less extensive, 18 scenarios were chosen, with 3 possible 
endings each: two portraying a harmful action and one neutral. Participants were asked to 
read each story and rate to what extent they would experience each emotion on a 7-point 
scale (1=not at all; 4=fairly; 7=extremely). Mean ratings of each moral emotion were created 
after subtracting neutral ratings from target ratings within each scenario. 
 
2.3.3.6. Moral dilemmas task 
Based on previous published work (e.g. Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 
2001; Koenigs, et al., 2007), this task is a scenario-based measure of moral decision. 
Participants were asked to make decisions on a series of 8 moral dilemmas portraying a 
choice of whether or not to sacrifice one person’s life in order to save the lives of a group of 
others, differing on whether there is direct physical contact with the victim (Personal 
dilemmas) or not (Impersonal dilemmas). Participants were asked to answer if they ‘Would 
do… in order to…?’ and to rate the difficulty of the decision on a 10-point scale. 
 
2.4. Data analyses 
Mean inter-item correlations for the SRP Interpersonal (.23), Affective (.24), Lifestyle (.28), 
and Antisocial (.21) scales suggested item homogeneity indicating that they were 
unidimensional indicators of their respective factors. Alpha for the total SRP scale was good 
(.85), and similarly for the items used to form composite scores of the traditional F1 (.79) and 
F2 (.73) dimensions. The F1 and F2 composites were significantly correlated (r = .62, p < 
.001). To verify the adequacy of the two-factor model of the SRP-4-SF, confirmatory factor 
analysis was conducted using Mplus, Version 6.1 (Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2010). Using the 
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Interpersonal and Affective SRP scale scores as indicators of F1, and Lifestyle, Antisocial 
scales as F2 indicators, the 2-factor solution of the SRP-4-SF showed good model fit (Model 
fit: X2(1) = 2.82, p > .05, CFI = .987, SRMR = .021). 
 
Pearson and Spearman correlational analyses were conducted using SPSS, version 13.0 for 
Windows. Preliminary analyses showed that estimated IQ was significantly correlated with 
some of the measures. Therefore, two sets of analyses were conducted. First, estimated IQ 
was entered as a control variable in order to adjust for the influence of cognitive ability on the 
relationships. Second, to examine the unique variance of each dimension in relation to 
criterion variables, each dimension of SRP was also partialled out from one another. 
 
Benjamini and Hochberg False Discovery Rate (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) was used to 
control for the probability of making a Type I error on multiple comparisons. Corrected p-
values are presented. 
 
Where distinct associations between the two SRP dimensions and a given criterion variable 
were identified, Steiger’s Z-tests (two-tailed) were conducted to test if the difference between 
the correlations was significantly different. 
 
3. Results  
Descriptive statistics and a complete correlational table for all experimental paradigms can be 
found in supplementary materials.  
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Pearson and Spearman’s correlation coefficients and False Discovery Rate adjusted p-values 
between SRP dimensions and all measures used are reported in Table 1. Z and p-values of 
difference between regression coefficients are also presented. 
 
************ Insert Table 1 about here ************* 
 
After correcting p-values for multiple comparisons, no significant associations between the 
dimensions of SRP and variables of Multimorph and Moral emotions tasks were found. Both 
SRP dimensions showed significant associations with less negative empathic responses to 
fearful faces and the affective-interpersonal dimension showed an additional significant 
association with less positive emotional responses to happy stories. Significantly different 
and opposite associations between the SRP dimensions and propensity to feel empathic 
concern were found. Affective-interpersonal dimension was negatively associated with the 
propensity to feel empathic concern, whilst lifestyle-antisocial dimension showed the 
opposite direction when the overlap between the two dimensions was accounted for. There 
were no significant associations between SRP dimensions and endorsement of actions on the 
moral dilemmas task, but both dimensions showed negative associations with perceived 
difficulty in making those decisions. However, the associations with lifestyle-antisocial 
dimension ceased to be significant when affective-interpersonal was kept constant. 
 
4. Discussion 
This study examined the associations between multiple measures of affect, empathy and 
morality with different features of the psychopathic personality, in a community sample of 
males. Overall, our findings indicate that in the general population, both dimensions of 
psychopathy are associated with weaker empathic responses to fearful faces. Our data also 
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suggest that there appears to be some specificity between the two dimensions of psychopathy 
and domains of empathic and moral processing: the unique variance of the SRP affective-
interpersonal dimension was associated with weaker empathic response to happy stories, 
lower propensity to feel empathic concern and less difficulty to make decisions in moral 
dilemmas; in contrast, the unique variance of the SRP lifestyle-antisocial dimension was 
associated with greater propensity to feel empathic concern. 
 
Although difficulties in recognising sad and fearful facial affect have been reported in 
previous studies (e.g. Blair, et al., 2004; Montagne, et al., 2005), no significant correlations 
between the dimensions of the SRP and sensitivity to recognise facial affect survived 
correction for multiple comparisons in the present study. Previous research with a community 
sample has reported similar negative results (Del Gaizo & Falkenbach, 2008). It is possible 
that impairments in emotional recognition are present only in clinical cohorts of psychopathy, 
which would explain the lack of consistent findings in studies using community samples. 
 
Similar to Ali and colleagues (2009), our findings indicated an association between 
psychopathic traits and less negative emotional responses to fearful faces in the SAM-Faces 
task. Both dimensions of psychopathy were related to less negative emotional responses to 
fearful faces. However, these associations ceased to be significant once the shared variance 
was removed, suggesting that the variance shared by the dimensions of psychopathy drives 
the reduced emotional response to fearful faces. On the other hand, only the affective-
interpersonal dimension of the SRP was significantly correlated with less positive emotional 
responses to happy stories, even when the variance overlap with the lifestyle-antisocial 
dimension was accounted for. This finding might indicate that affective-interpersonal features 
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of psychopathy are associated with diminished empathic responsiveness to positive, as well 
as negative emotions. 
 
Although no significant correlations with the moral emotions task variables survived 
correction for multiple comparisons, we did find opposite significant correlations between 
both SRP dimensions and propensity to feel empathic concern. Empathic concern is 
considered to be a prototypical moral emotion (Eisenberg, 2000), and thus to function as a 
moral barometer motivating behaviour. The unique variance associated with affective-
interpersonal features was correlated with lower propensity to feel concern for others, 
whereas the unique variance associated with lifestyle-antisocial was correlated with greater 
propensity to feel concern for the distress of others. Similar effects revealing opposing 
associations have been reported previously, with evidence from forensic and community 
samples suggesting that the two dimensions of psychopathy have opposite relationships with 
emotion and emotional reactivity. For example, previous studies have shown that after 
controlling for the overlap between the two dimensions, the affective-interpersonal dimension 
is negatively associated with constructs such as emotional distress, fearfulness, trait negative 
affect, whilst the impulsive-antisocial behaviour dimension is positively associated with these 
constructs (Hicks & Patrick, 2006). Our results also indicate that neither SRP dimension is 
associated with increased endorsement of actions in the moral dilemmas task, replicating 
previous data from forensic (Cima, et al., 2010) and community samples (Glenn, Raine, 
Schug, et al., 2009). Nonetheless, affective-interpersonal features appear to diminish the level 
of difficulty that making these decisions represent. To our knowledge this is the first study 
exploring perceived difficulty in making decisions on moral dilemmas in relation to 
psychopathic traits. The perceived ease with which those individuals high on affective-
interpersonal features made moral decisions could merely reflect a general ease in decision 
 15 
 
making, rather than anything circumscribed to moral decision making. Alternatively, it could 
specifically reflect ease in making decisions about emotionally aversive dilemmas and, taken 
together with the other findings, reflect some level of emotional disengagement. The moral 
dilemmas task used in this study comprised highly emotional moral dilemmas involving the 
sacrifice of one life to save the life of a group of others. These moral dilemmas have been 
found to evoke activity in the amygdala and other brain structures implicated in emotional 
processing (Greene et al., 2001). At the same time, it has been found that in subjects scoring 
higher in psychopathy traits, amygdala functioning is disrupted during moral decision making 
(Glenn, Raine, & Schug, 2009). Unfortunately, these alternative hypotheses cannot be tested 
with the current data.  
 
Some limitations of this research should be noted. Although our results suggest that the 
different features of the psychopathy have at least partially divergent associations with certain 
domains of emotional, empathy and moral processing (as evidenced by statistically 
significant differences in the correlation coefficients), research on larger samples is required 
to reliably test the difference between the correlations of the SRP dimensions and the 
criterion variables. It should also be noted that a number of potentially interesting 
associations did not survive correction for multiple comparisons in these exploratory 
analyses.  These negative results should be interpreted with caution due to restricted 
statistical power afforded by our sample.  
 
This was the first study to administer a large battery of affect, empathy, and morality tasks 
and relate these to different features of psychopathy. The preliminary findings from this study 
suggest that both dimensions of psychopathy make some distinct contributions to empathy 
and affective aspects of moral processing. Research on larger samples from community and 
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forensic settings is required to probe the precise extent to which different features of 
psychopathy have distinct associations with particular empathic and moral features.  
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Table 1. Correlations between SRP scores and experimental measures 
  SRP total score   SRP Affective-Interpersonal (AI)   SRP Lifestyle-Antisocial (LA) 
  Controlling for IQ   Controlling for IQ   Controlling for IQ & LA   Controlling for IQ   Controlling for IQ & AI 
    r corrected p   r corrected p   r corrected p   r corrected p   r corrected p 
Multimorph: Stage scores1                              
Sad faces   -0.02 ns   0.00 ns  0.03 ns   -0.04 ns   -0.05 ns 
Fearful faces   0.09 ns   -0.16 ns   -0.18 ns   -0.03 ns   0.09 ns 
Angry faces   0.10 ns   0.00 ns   0.10 ns   -0.12 ns   -0.16 ns 
Happy faces   0.01 ns   0.01 ns   0.01 ns   -0.01 ns   -0.01 ns 
SAM-Faces: Valence ratings1                              
Sad faces   0.18 ns   0.18 ns   0.13 ns   0.13 ns   0.02 ns 
Fearful faces   0.31 0.004   0.25 0.029   0.07 ns   0.32 0.004   0.22 ns 
Angry faces   0.20 ns   0.15 ns   0.02 ns   0.22 ns   0.16 ns 
Neutral faces   0.03 ns   0.01 ns   -0.01 ns   0.04 ns   0.04 ns 
Happy faces   -0.19 ns   -0.22 ns   -0.12 ns   -0.19 ns   0.03 ns 
SAM-Stories: Valence ratings1                              
Sad stories   0.09 ns   0.12 ns   0.13 ns   0.02 ns   -0.06 ns 
Anger stories   0.10 ns   0.11 ns   0.08 ns   0.07 ns   0.00 ns 
Happy stories   -0.20 ns   -0.26 0.024   -0.26* 0.035   -0.09 ns   0.09* ns 
IRI: Empathic concern1   -0.27 0.015   -0.40 0.000   -0.46* 0.000   -0.06 ns   0.26* 0.042 
Moral Emotions task: Ratings1                              
Compassion   0.09 ns   0.04 ns  -0.05 ns   0.13 ns   0.13 ns 
Guilt   -0.15 ns   -0.17 ns  -0.15 ns   -0.08 ns   0.03 ns 
Other-Anger   0.19 ns   0.22 ns  0.19 ns   0.12 ns   -0.02 ns 
Self-Anger   0.09 ns   0.13 ns  0.14 ns   0.04 ns   -0.06 ns 
Moral dilemmas: Action endorsement2                            
Impersonal dilemmas   -0.04 ns   -0.06 ns   -0.07 ns   -0.01 ns   0.03 ns 
Personal dilemmas   0.09 ns   0.06 ns   -0.01 ns   0.11 ns   0.08 ns 
Moral Dilemmas: Difficulty ratings1                              
Impersonal dilemmas   -0.38 0.000   -0.39 0.000   -0.30† 0.017   -0.28 0.016   -0.05† ns 
Personal dilemmas   -0.27 0.012   -0.28 0.014   -0.20 ns   -0.20 ns   -0.04 ns 
1 Pearson partial correlation coefficients are reported. (2-tailed) 
2 Spearman partial correlation coefficients are reported. (2-tailed) 
* After controlling for IQ and shared variance, SRP AI and SRP LA presented significantly different regression coefficents with Valence ratings of happy stories (z= 2.18; p=0.03) and IRI Empathic 
Concern (z= 4.61; p=0.00)  
† After controlling for IQ and shared variance, SRP AI and SRP LA difference between regression coefficients did not reach statistical significance (z= 2.18; p=0.12) 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Age 26.23 7.07 18 48
IQ 115.81 13.14 79 137
SRP-4-SF1, 2
Total 61.84 13.28 33 102
Affective-Interpersonal dimension 32.15 7.98 14 56
Impulsive-Antisocial dimension 28.56 6.57 16 45
Multimorph: Recognition stage score
Sad faces 9.38 0.32 0 17.33
Fearful faces 10.90 0.26 3.67 17.67
Angry faces 11.10 0.34 1 19
Happy faces 14.65 0.27 2 19.33
SAM-Faces: Valence ratings
Valence sad faces 2.88 0.92 1 5.13
Valence fearful faces 3.63 1.07 1 6
Valence angry faces 4.01 1.20 1 6.63
Valence neutral faces 5.16 0.65 2 6.63
Valence happy faces 6.53 1.12 2.13 9
SAM-Stories: Valence ratings
Sad stories 2.31 1.13 1 8.5
Anger stories 3.62 1.16 1 6.5
Happy stories 7.12 1.21 2.25 9
IRI: Empathic concern 18.40 4.87 5 28
Moral Emotions task: Ratings
Compassion 2.55 1.61 -2.25 5.25
Guilt 4.14 1.23 0.44 6
Other-Anger 3.54 1.24 -0.3 6
Self-Anger 3.90 1.24 0 6
Moral dilemmas: Action endorsement
Impersonal dilemmas 3.38 1.04 0 4
Personal dilemmas 1.27 0.99 0 4
Moral Dilemmas: Difficulty ratings
Impersonal dilemmas 5.67 2.33 1 10
Personal dilemmas 4.97 2.24 1 10
1Descriptive statistics of a sample of 304 male offenders: SRP total score: mean=77.47; SD=17.32; 
minimum=35 and maximum=127 (Paulhus, Neumman & Hare, in Press)
2SRP total score, SRP AI and SRP LA follow ed a normal distribution, w ith skew ness = 0.147; 0.151; and 
0.28, respectively; and kurtosis = 0.254; 0.235; and -0.179, respectively.
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Table 2. Correlations between all experimental variables and estimated IQ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1. Estimated IQ
Multimorph: Recognition stage score1
2. Sad faces 0.26**
3. Fearful faces 0.40*** 0.41***
4. Angry faces 0.23** 0.50*** 0.53***
5. Happy faces 0.35*** 0.49*** 0.51*** 0.59***
SAM-Faces: Valence ratings1
6. Sad faces 0.06 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.01
7. Fearful faces 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.64***
8. Angry faces 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.52*** 0.75***
9. Neutral faces -0.05 -0.02 -0.16 -0.12 -0.09 0.14 0.31*** 0.30***
10. Happy faces -0.17* -0.03 -0.12 -0.15 -0.02 -0.34*** -0.16 -0.12 0.50***
SAM-Stories: Valence ratings1
11. Sad stories 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.55*** 0.28** 0.15 -0.30** -0.40***
12. Anger stories 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.48*** 0.39*** 0.31*** -0.14 -0.34*** 0.65***
13. Happy stories -0.26** -0.08 -0.15 -0.09 -0.13 -0.40*** -0.32*** -0.20* 0.14 0.48*** -0.48*** -0.47***
14. IRI: Empathic concern1 -0.04 -0.01 -0.10 -0.06 -0.09 -0.18* -0.13 -0.07 0.08 0.18* -0.24** -0.11 0.29***
Moral Emotions task: Ratings1
15. Compassion 0.29** 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.04 -0.08 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.16 0.24**
16. Guilt 0.00 0.05 0.17 0.16 -0.03 -0.33*** -0.17 -0.05 0.08 0.26** -0.35*** -0.32*** 0.45*** 0.25** 0.41***
17. Other-Anger -0.09 0.02 0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.20* -0.12 -0.02 0.03 0.07 -0.23** -0.28*** 0.26** 0.02 0.16 0.38***
18. Self-Anger -0.18* 0.03 0.07 0.03 -0.11 -0.29*** -0.13 -0.01 -0.03 0.07 -0.26** -0.27** 0.33*** 0.02 0.23** 0.62*** 0.59***
Moral dilemmas: Action endorsement2
19. Impersonal dilemmas 0.27** 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.00 -0.06 0.02 0.09 -0.11 -0.07 -0.16
20. Personal dilemmas -0.17 0.12 -0.06 0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.18* -0.17 0.05 -0.05 0.25**
Moral Dilemmas: Difficulty ratings1
21. Impersonal dilemmas -0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.24** -0.26** -0.16 -0.15 0.05 -0.15 -0.13 0.18* 0.19* -0.07 0.21* 0.06 0.12 -0.29** -0.21*
22. Personal dilemmas -0.02 0.14 0.08 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.14 -0.10 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 -0.18* 0.12 0.10 -0.10 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.29** 0.46***
1
 Partial Pearson correlation coefficients are reported; ***p<0.001, **0.001<p<0.01, *0.01<p<0.05 (2-tailed)
2 
Partial Spearman correlation coefficients are reported; ***p<0.001, **0.001<p<0.01, *0.01<p<0.05 (2-tailed)
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Table 3. Correlations between all experimental variables controlling for estimated IQ 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Multimorph: Recognition stage score1
1. Sad faces
2. Fearful faces 0.35***
3. Angry faces 0.46*** 0.49***
4. Happy faces 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.56***
SAM-Faces: Valence ratings1
5. Sad faces -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01
6. Fearful faces 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.64***
7. Angry faces 0.10 -0.01 0.08 -0.03 0.52*** 0.75***
8. Neutral faces -0.01 -0.15 -0.11 -0.08 0.15 0.32*** 0.30***
9. Happy faces 0.02 -0.06 -0.12 0.05 -0.34*** -0.14 -0.12 0.50***
SAM-Stories: Valence ratings1
10. Sad stories 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.55*** 0.26** 0.15 -0.29*** -0.38***
11. Anger stories 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.47*** 0.38*** 0.31*** -0.14 -0.33*** 0.64***
12. Happy stories -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.40*** -0.30*** -0.19* 0.13 0.46*** -0.47*** -0.47***
13. IRI: Empathic concern1 0.00 -0.09 -0.05 -0.08 -0.18* -0.13 -0.07 0.08 0.17 -0.24** -0.10 0.29***
Moral Emotions task: Ratings1
14. Compassion 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.07 -0.10 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.26** 0.26**
15. Guilt 0.05 0.19* 0.16 -0.03 -0.33*** -0.17 -0.05 0.08 0.26** -0.36*** -0.32*** 0.46*** 0.25** 0.43***
16. Other-Anger 0.04 0.11 -0.03 -0.02 -0.19* -0.11 -0.02 0.03 0.06 -0.22** -0.28*** 0.24** 0.02 0.20* 0.38***
17. Self-Anger 0.08 0.16 0.07 -0.05 -0.28** -0.12 -0.01 -0.04 0.04 -0.25** -0.27** 0.30** 0.02 0.30** 0.63*** 0.58***
Moral dilemmas: Action endorsement2
18. Impersonal dilemmas -0.07 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.12 -0.06 -0.11
19. Personal dilemmas 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.10 -0.02 -0.14 -0.17 0.04 -0.08 0.46***
Moral Dilemmas: Difficulty ratings1
20. Impersonal dilemmas 0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 -0.24** -0.26** -0.16 -0.15 0.05 -0.14 -0.13 0.18* 0.19* -0.07 0.21* 0.06 0.12 -0.28** -0.22*
21. Personal dilemmas 0.15 0.09 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.14 -0.10 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 -0.18* 0.12 0.10 -0.10 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 0.06 0.27** 0.46***
1
 Partial Pearson correlation coefficients are reported; ***p<0.001, **0.001<p<0.01, *0.01<p<0.05 (2-tailed)
2 
Partial Spearman correlation coefficients are reported; ***p<0.001, **0.001<p<0.01, *0.01<p<0.05 (2-tailed)
